realized to the full the implications of the revulsion in which he thus took part. For that revulsion in the name of ethics, that rejection of the mechanical theory of man, meant the rejection of all the principal conclusions which the biologists of his school had so confidently announced, and the throwing open again of all the great questions, such questions as man's place in nature, the factors of evolution, the core of truth in all religions, and the essential validity of ethical principles.

Huxley seems to have been moved to his revulsion by pondering upon the intolerable implications for human life of the mechanical biology. But the advance of biology in various branches since the turn of the century has had a similar liberalizing influence upon many of its devotees. Psychologists have for the most part discovered that the doctrine of ideas associated together, or trailed helplessly at the chariot-wheels of all-powerful reflexes, provides at its best but a caricature of our mental life, one which omits all mention of its most distinctive and fundamental features, especially of its active nature, its energetic striving towards this and that goal, the experience of which is the ground of all our conception of activity and of energy. The behaviour of animals also, and not only of the higher animals but also of the lower forms right down to the unicellular microscopic specks of protoplasm, has been found recalcitrant to all the attempts at mechanistic explanation honestly and critically applied.

The doctrine of organic evolution, in so far as it is

uaerely descriptive or historical, attains to ever more well-established details; but the purely mechanistic explanation of the process known as neo-Darwinism seems, to an increasing number of biologists, totally inadequate.